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Professional Responsibility
By EUGENE R. GAETKE* AND REBECCA G. CASEY* *
In the face of persistent criticism of the legal profession, from
within1 as well as without,2 the Kentucky Supreme Court ex-
hibits a certain degree of ambivalence toward issues of profes-
sional responsibility. This ambivalence manifests itself in two
ways.
First, the Court's treatment of different categories of profes-
sional misconduct seems at times unjustifiably inconsistent. The
Court reacts to certain misconduct in an almost uniformly harsh
manner, evincing the attitude of a strict disciplinarian for the
practicing bar. 3 Occasionally, however, the Court responds to
various other kinds of equally gross misconduct with apparently
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974, Univer-
sity of Minnesota.
J.D. 1982, University of Kentucky.
1 For example, attorneys have been criticized for doing "too little to confront the
ethical problems pushed to the front by changes in the character of a legal practice. Both
bench and bar are too slow to deal with abuses." Cox, The Lawyer's Independent Calling,
67 Ky. L.J. 5, 6 (1978-79).
2 See, e.g., Why LawyersAre in the Doghouse, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., May 11,
1981, at 38. See also Public 'Shyster' OK-If He's On Your Side, 67 A.B.A. J. 695 (1981).
3 In Kentucky, the Supreme Court is required by the state constitution to "govern
admission to the Bar and the discipline of members of the Bar." Ky. CONST. § 116. The
Court has promulgated rules governing the practice of law codified as KENTUCKY SuPREME
COURT RuLEs 3.010-.690 [hereinafter cited as SCR]. The Court has also designated the
beard of governors of the Kentucky Bar Association as its agent for the purpose of adminis-
tering and enforcing these rules. SCR 3.070. The Court reviews the actions taken by the
board of governors in disciplinary cases. SCR 3.370(5)-(9). For a discussion of the discipli-
nary process in Kentucky, see Leathers, Kentucky Law Survey-Professional Responsibil-
ity, 65 Ky. L.J. 397, 398 n.4 (1976-77). For an historical account of the regulation of the
bar in Kentucky, see Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d 682, 683-84 (Ky.
1981). See also Huelsmann & Deener, Legal Ethics in Kentucky: Background of the Code
of Ethics, 42 KY. BENCH & B. 10 (1978).
Kentucky relies on the American Bar Association [hereinafter referred to as ABA]
disciplinary standards as published in the MODEL CODE OF PRoP-55IONAL PESPONsmILIrry
(1969). See notes 99 & 100 infra and the accompanying text for a discussion of Kentucky's
adherence to the 1969 Code despite subsequent amendments by the ABA. For purposes of
this article, the word "Code" refers to the ABA disciplinary rules [hereinafter cited as DR].
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undue leniency. 4 In such cases the Court seems to perceive itself
as a forgiving guardian of erring practitioners.
Second, even within certain categories of misconduct toward
which the Court generally reacts harshly, the Court will some-
times respond with unexplained moderation. 5 The regular failure
of the Court to explain the discrepancies in punishment assessed
for sirilar instances of misconduct engenders uncertainty re-
garding the Court's attitude toward that misconduct .
6
Certainly unprofessional conduct arises in many contexts,
forms, and degrees, and not every breach of professional ethics
should result in the same sanction-harsh or lenient. 7 The Court
must mold its punishment to fit its view of the seriousness of the
offense and the mitigating factors involved, a process which nat-
urally leads to some variations in the treatment of different of-
fenders. Still, the reader of the Court's professional responsibility
opinions issued during this survey period 8 might well conclude
The Code is trifurcated into DR's, which are the mandatory standards the violations of
which subject the profession to discipline; Canons, which serve as the section headings of
the code and which state broad axiomatic propositions of ethical standards; and Ethical
Considerations [hereinafter cited as EC], which are merely aspirational guidelines and not
intended to be specific grounds of discipline. See Preliminary Statement to the MODEL
CODE OF PROEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
4 See the text accompanying notes 42-71 infra for a discussion of such apparently
unjustifiable leniency.
5 See the text accompanying notes 24-34 and 42-48 infra for examples of the Court's
moderate treatment of cases involving misconduct generally receiving harsher sanctions.
6 One unfortunate trend in Kentucky disciplinary cases is the extreme brevity of the
opinions issued by the Court. It is not unusual to find published opinions disciplining at-
torneys without reference to the conduct involved. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Wat-
son, 597 S.W.2d 150 (Ky. 1979) (attorney suspended for 90 days for unspecified "unethical
and unprofessional conduct calculated to bring the bench and bar of Kentucky into disre-
pute"). Even when the conduct is mentioned, the Court frequently fails to discuss the cir-
cumstances surrounding that conduct with sufficient detail to advise the reader of the
seriousness of the violation, the presence of mitigating factors, or the appropriateness of
the punishment imposed. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Albert, 549 S.W.2d 295 (Ky.
1976) (attorney publicly reprimanded for an undisclosed violation of DR 2-103 prohibiting
solicitation of clients). For further discussion of the brevity of the Court's opinions, see the
text accompanying notes 25-34 and 42-48 infra.
7 There are six degrees of discipline for attorneys found guilty of unprofessional con-
duct in Kentucky: admonition, private reprimand, public reprimand, censure, suspen-
sion, and disbarment. SCR 3.380.
8 This Survey includes disciplinary opinions of the Court from July, 1979 to Decem-
ber, 1981.
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that the Court is not as determined to eradicate some forms of
egregious misconduct as it is others and might further conclude
that punishment for similar offenses is not uniformly imposed.
I. MISUSE OF CLIENTS FUNDS
The Court reacts most consistently 9 and harshly to attorneys
charged with misuse of their clients' funds. 0 With rare excep-
During the survey period the Court rendered two nondisciplinary opinions. In In
re Advisory Opinion of Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 613 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1981), the Court was
asked to review a Board of Governors Opinion, E-230, which prohibits an attorney who
represents the Fraternal Order of Police in grievances and other civil matters from practic-
ing criminal law in the same jurisdiction. Id. The Court wholeheartedly upheld the opin-
ion, perceiving a conflict of interest problem if an attorney were allowed to represent
both. Id. Because the energetic representation of criminal defendants may often require
vigorous cross-examination of police officers in an attempt to discredit their testimony, the
attorney may well be confronted with the dilemma of alienating a police officer in order
to produce the best defense versus maintaining cordial relations with a police officer at the
expense of his client's defense. Id. Thus, the attorney may not be able to exercise his "inde-
pendent professional judgment" as Canon 5 requires. Canon 9 also supported the Court's
conclusion. Id. Since criminal defense is naturally subject to intense public scrntiny, the
Court felt that all doubts should be resolved against representation since doing so pre-
sented the only way to meet the public demand for professional independence. Id.
In another advisory opinion, Ex parte Auditor of Public Accounts, 609 S.W.2d
682, the Court decided that the Auditor of Public Accounts was not legally entitled to a
general audit of the Kentucky Bar Association's books and accounts. Id. at 689.
The Kentucky Supreme Court also reviewed one action of the Judicial Retirement
and Removal Commission. In Long v. Judicial Retirement & Removal Comm'n, 610
S.W.2d 614 (Ky. 1980), the Court upheld the Commission's finding that the judge know-
ingly used his powers to protect the local bootlegging industry. As a result, he was found
guilty of misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, and violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly Canons 1, 2, and 3. Id. at 615. The Judicial Retire-
ment and Removal Commission had decided to suspend the judge from his office as dis-
trict judge, without pay, for 12 months, thus bypassing the more stringent penalty of re-
moval from office. Id. The Court felt, however, that since the judge's term expired within
12 months, the suspension operated as a removal from office. Id. It also felt that removal
was not the penalty which the Commission anticipated or intended and modified the
penalty by reducing the suspension to six months, thereby preserving its operation as a sus-
pension rather than a removal from office. Id. In light of the misconduct involved, the im-
position of a six month suspension seems unduly lenient.
9 See Leathers, supra note 3, at 398-400; Wallingford, Kentucky Law Survey-Pro-
.fesional Responsibility, 67 Ky. L.J. 757, 764-66 (1978-79).
10 Such conduct is prohibited by DR 9-102 of the Code:
Preserving Identity of Funds and Property of a Client.
(A) All funds of clients paid to a lawyer or law firm, other than advances for
costs and expenses, shall be deposited in one or more identifiable bank ac-
1981-82]
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tions" such conduct results in disbarment.
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Dungan,12 for example, the
respondent attorney, acting as an appointed public defender, re-
ceived from his client's mother $1,000, which was deposited in
his escrow account. 3 Upon conclusion of the representation, the
respondent paid the fine and court costs of $159 out of the escrow
account, returned $141 to the client's mother, and kept $700
himself.14 For failing to return the $700 and for making a false
statement to a court regarding the status of the client's money,15
counts maintained in the state in which the law office is situated and no
funds belonging to the lawyer or law firm shall be deposited therein except
as follows:
(1) Funds reasonably sufficient to pay bank charges may be deposited
therein.
(2) Funds belonging in part to a client and in part presently or potential-
ly to the lawyer or law firm must be deposited therein, but the portion
belonging to the lawyer or law firm may be withdrawn when due unless
the right of the lawyer or law firm to receive it is disputed by the client,
in which event the disputed portion shall not be withdrawn until the dis-
pute is finally resolved.
(B) A lawyer shall:
(1) Promptly notify a client of the receipt of his funds, securities, or other
properties.
(2) Identify and label securities and properties of a client promptly upon
receipt and place them in a safe deposit box or other place of safekeeping
as soon as practicable.
(3) Maintain complete records of all funds, securities, and other proper-
ties of a client coming into the possession of the lawyer and render appro-
priate accounts to his client regarding them.
(4) Promptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the
funds, securities, or other properties in the possession of the lawyer
which the client is entitled to receive.
DR 9-102. Unfortunately, the Court generally chooses to discipline attorneys under the
catch-all language "unprofessional or unethical conduct tending to bring the bench and
bar into disrepute," SCR 3.130(1), rather than under the specific provisions of the Code.
For further discussion of this tendency of the Court, see notes 101-04 infra. See also
Gaetke, Solicitation and the Uncertain Status of the Code of Professional Responsibility in
Kentucky, 70 Ky. L.J. (in print) (1981-82).
11 See the text accompanying notes 25-34 infra for a discussion of such an exceptional
case. See also Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Graves, 556 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1977).
12 586 S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1979).
'" Id. at 16.
14 Id.
1 Id. Disciplinary cases involving the misuse of clients' funds also frequently involve
false statements by the attorney, usually made to avoid detection of the financial impro-
priety. For the Court's reaction to disciplinary cases involving false statements and misrep-
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the attorney was disbarred.16
Similarly, in Kentucky Bar Association v. Brown,17 the re-
spondent attorney, Brown, was advanced substantial funds by a
client to defray expenses of litigation, which Brown failed to
pay." After failing to render a requested accounting of the funds,
Brown wrote a check in partial payment-a check which was re-
turned due to insufficient funds. 9 The Court found the attor-
ney's failure to render an accounting to his client sufficient to
support an inference that the funds were misappropriated and
found the returned check conclusive evidence that the funds had
been converted to the attorney's own use.20 The attorney was dis-
barred.21
The Court's harsh reaction to the misuse of clients' funds is
entirely appropriate. The conduct indicates dishonesty and de-
ception on the part of an attorney who engages in it.2 Moreover,
the misuse of clients' funds negatively reflects on the entire legal
profession and engenders mistrust between clients and their at-
torneys2 3 Surely if clients are to trust to their attorneys the reso-
lution of their most serious problems, they must be able to trust
their attorneys with their money and property as well.
Despite the Court's regular disbarment of attorneys misusing
resentation by attorneys in the absence of misuse of clients' funds, see the text accompany-
ing notes 35-48 infra.
16 586 S.W.2d at 16.
17 613 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1981). When this action was commenced, the respondent at-
torney was already under suspension for neglect of his clients' affairs. Id. See Kentucky
Bar Ass'n v. Brown, 599 S.W.2d 169 (Ky. 1980) (discussed in note 59 infra).
18 613 S.W.2d at 418.
19 Id.
0 Id.
21 Id.
22 The Court has stated:
When an attorney converts his client's funds to his own use, he com-
mits an offense greater and broader than a mere injury to his client, he
brings the entire bar into disrepute in the eyes of the public. Such conduct
evinces the unfitness of the attorney to be a member of the legal profession
and an officer of the court.
Kentucky Bar Ass'n. v. Collis, 535 S.W.2d 95, 96 (Ky. 1975).
' Indeed, even the commingling of clients' and attorneys' funds where there is no
misuse of the clients' funds by the attorney creates the appearance of professional impro-
priety which is prohibited by DR 9-102(A). See note 10 supra for the text of DR 9-102(A).
See also EC 9-5.
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their clients' funds,2 in Kentucky Bar Association v. Berry2 the
Court imposed only a three-pear suspension.26 In Berry, the re-
spondent attorney, acting as executor of a large estate, made fif-
teen unsecured loans to himself from the estate fundsw at interest
rates below those prevailing in the market.2s Furthermore, nu-
merous other loans of estate funds were made by Berry to bus-
iness associates and relatives, including his brother, an individual
who was unable to obtain loans from a bank and whose failure to
pay interest was forgiven by Berry on behalf of the estate.2 The
Court noted, however, that the estate had increased in value
4 A related case involving the misuse of funds, though not those of a client, is Ken-
tucky Bar Ass'n v. Ricketts, 599 S.W.2d 454 (Ky. 1980). In Ricketts, the respondent attor-
ney negotiated a worker's compensation settlement of $22,430. Id. The insurer forwarded
a check in that amount to Ricketts, who properly endorsed and delivered it to his client.
Id. at 455. Subsequently, however, the insurer erroneously mailed a second check in that
amount to Ricketts, who had his client endorse it and then deposited it in his own account.
Id. Ricketts spent the entire proceeds of the second check on personal expenses. Id. The
Court found his actions an "unacceptable course of conduct for a lawyer." Id. at 456.
Ricketts was disbarred. Id.
25626 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1981).
6 Id. at 633. This is not to suggest that a three-year suspension is an insignificant
sanction. An attorney suspended for disciplinary infractions must seek reinstatement by
the Kentucky Supreme Court, and applicants for reinstatement are subjected to character
and fitness investigation by the bar association. SCR 3.510(1). If the suspension is for more
than five years, the applicant for reinstatement must pass a written examination on proce-
dure and ethics. Id. The procedures for reinstatement after disbarment are similar. See
SCR 3.520(1). It is clear, therefore, that suspension from the practice of law is a serious
sanction indeed. Yet it is also clear that a suspension, for whatever period, is perceived by
the court, the bar, and the public as less serious than disbarment.
27 626 S.W.2d at 633. Strictly speaking, the attorney's conduct in Berry, rather than
being a misuse of clients' funds under DR 9-102, was in the nature of a conflict of interest.
By loaning estate money to himself, the attorney arguably violated DR 5-104(A), which
provides that
[a] lawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client if they
have differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to exercise
his professional judgment therein for the protection of the client, unless the
client has consented after full disclosure.
By failing to pay the market interest rates for his loans and forgiving the unpaid interest on
other loans, the attorney also may have prejudiced his client under DR 7-101 (A) (3).
The Court did not discuss the applicable Code provisions in disposing of the case.
Nevertheless, Berry's personal use of the estate funds was so extensive that disposition con-
sistent with cases involving misuse of clients' funds would have been appropriate. See note
10 supra for the text of DR 9-102, which prohibits misuse of clients' funds.
28 626 S.W.2d at 633.
29 Id.
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under the attorney's management 3° and that "other evidence of
mitigation" had been considered by the Court in concluding that
a three-year suspension was the appropriate punishment. 3' Un-
fortunately the Court failed to disclose those mitigating factors,
rendering impossible the reconciliaton of the Berry case with the
decisions in Dungan3 and Brown.3m Without a discussion of those
factors, Berry seems to be an example of unjustifiable leniency.3
II. MISREPRESENTATION AND FALSE STATEMENTS
Another form of professional misconduct warranting severe
punishment, in addition to misuse of clients' funds,s is misrepre-
sentation by an attorney.'- Such conduct reflects adversely on the
honesty and character necessary for both the individual and the
bar to fulfill the profession's obligations to the public and the ju-
dicial system.
It is understandable, therefore, that the Court disbarred the
respondent attorney in Kentucky Bar Association v. Hammond.37
While representing claimants in two workers' compensation ac-
tions, Hammond falsified medical reports and forged a physi-
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 586 S.W.2d 15. See the text accompanying notes 12-16 supra for a discussion of
Dungan.
33 613 S.W.2d 418. See the text accompanying notes 17-21 supra for a discussion of
Brown.
34 For a discussion of the difficulties created by the Court's tendency to render overly
brief opinions in disciplinary cases, see the text accompanying notes 6 supra.
3 See the text accompanying notes 9-34 supra for a discussion of the Court's treat-
ment of misuse of clients' funds.
36 Such conduct is, of course, prohibited under the Code. DR 1-102(A)(4) prohibits
an attorney from engaging "in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation." Similarly, DR 7-102(A)(5) provides that an attorney shall not "[kinowingly
make a false statement of law or fact" in the representation of a client.
3 619 S.W.2d 696 (Ky. 1981). The Court also disbarred the respondent attorney in
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. White, 613 S.W.2d 132 (Ky. 1981), for conduct involving fraud
and misrepresentation. In White, the respondent attorney had pleaded guilty to two
counts of wire fraud, a felony, and to one count of failure to file a federal income tax re-
turn, a misdemeanor. Id. Even though Kentucky attorneys convicted only of failure to file
income tax returns are generally suspended for six months, see, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Kramer, 555 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1977); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Trimble, 540 S.W.2d 599
(Ky. 1976); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 537 S.W.2d 171 (Ky. 1976), White was
disbarred. This compels the conclusion that the additional conviction on wire fraud
charges was the reason for the stricter penalty of disbarment in White.
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cian's signature on them.," These medical reports were provided
to opposing counsel.- Despite the respondent's assertion that
such conduct is customary among attorneys in workers' compen-
sation cases,4" the Court concluded that "there is no justification
for an attorney to alter medical reports so as to report a nonexist-
ing condition."41
Given the justifiably harsh reaction of the Court to the
falsification of medical reports in Hammond, it is difficult to un-
derstand the outcome of Kentucky Bar Association v. Cohen.42
The respondent attorney in Cohen had altered the dates of depo-
sitions and affidavits and had also made false statements regard-
ing attorney's fees in bankruptcy petitions. 43 The Court neverthe-
less chose to impose only a two-year suspension on Cohen rather
than disbar him. 4
The seriousness of the misconduct in Cohen appears indistin-
guishable from that in Hammond.4 The falsification of docu-
ments in adjudicatory proceedings is so detrimental to the ad-
ministration of justice and so reflective of a lack of that degree of
honesty essential for the practice of law that, absent any extraor-
dinary circumstances, 46 the practice warrants disbarment. 4 The
38 619 S.W.2d at 697.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 699.
41 Id.
42 625 S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1981).
43Id. at 574.
44 Id.
45 See the text accompanying notes 37-41 supra for a discussion of Hammond.
46 If such circumstances were present in Cohen, the Court did not so state.
47 Yet another case during the survey period also involved misrepresentation. In
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Gangwish, 618 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1981), the respondent attorney de-
vised and advertised a genealogy tracing service under the corporate name of ReUnited,
Inc. Id. at 176. In response to inquiries, Gangwish mailed letters on his law office station-
ery, referring to himself as attorney for that corporation. Id. No such corporation existed,
a fact known to Gangwish. Id. The Court found such conduct to be false and misleading
and, in one of its rare references to the Code during this survey period, the Court held the
conduct a violation of DR 1-102(A) (4), which prohibits attorneys from engaging in "dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." Id. The Court publicly reprimanded the re-
spondent attorney. Id. at 177.
Unlike Hammond and Cohen, Cangwish did not involve the falsification of docu-
ments in adjudicatory proceedings. Furthermore, the respondent attorney's major error in
Gangwish appears to have been his failure to file the corporation's articles of incorpora-
tion, which he had drawn. Id. at 176. Thus the misrepresentation in Cangwish appears to
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more lenient treatment of the respondent attorney in Cohen,
however, remains unexplained, 48 and it stands as a stark contra-
diction of the Court's position in Hammond.
III. NEGLECT
While the Court usually reacts with harshness to the misuse
of clients' funds49 and misrepresentationO by Kentucky attorneys,
it is more lenient in its treatment of attorneys who have neglected
the legal matters entrusted to them. 5' In the worst cases of neg-
lect, such leniency constitutes an unfortunate message to the bar
and to the public regarding the significance of the problem of
neglect. 12
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Reed,Os the respondent at-
torney's neglect of legal matters entrusted to him resulted in sig-
nificant harm to his clients, including the removal of an adverse
party's assets from the state, 54 the entry of summary judgment
against one cient,s and a delay of nearly six years in the receipt
of workers' compensation benefits by another.0 In the face of
Reed's failure to respond to the charges of neglect, the Court sus-
pended him for one year. 5
be of a different nature, and lesser degree, than those in Hammond and Cohen, and the
Court's more lenient treatment of the respondent attorney seems justified.
4 See the text accompanying notes 6 supra for a discussion of the Court's general
failure to justify such leniency.
49 See the text accompanying notes 9-34 supra for a discussion of the misuse of clients'
funds.
o See the text accompanying notes 36-48 supra for a discussion of misrepresentation
and false statements.
51 Such conduct is prohibited by the Code under the Canon 6 exhortation that "a
lawyer should represent a client competently." DR 6-101(A) (3) provides that an attorney
shall not "[nieglect a legal matter entrusted to him."
52 The two types of complaints most frequently lodged with the Kentucky Bar Asso-
ciation regarding the conduct of Kentucky practitioners involve excessive fees and neglect
of clients' affairs. Address by Michael M. Hooper, Assistant Director, Kentucky Bar Asso-
ciation, to Professional Responsibility Class, University of Kentucky College of Law (Jan-
uary 19, 1982). The Kentucky Bar Association generally does not utilize the disciplinary
process for fee disputes, choosing instead to suggest a voluntary arbitration procedure. Id.
53 623 S.W.2d 228 (Ky. 1981).
54 Id. at 229.
5 Id. at 229-30.
56 Id. at 230-32.
5 Id. at 232.
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A one-year suspensions from the practice of law for such a
pattern of serious and prejudicial neglect seems unduly lenient.0
If the Court is intent on reducing the level of public disillusion-
ment with the legal profession, 60 it must act unequivocally to
punish harshly-that is, to disbar-those attorneys guilty of such
gross neglect.61
58 Two other cases involving neglect resulted in one-year suspensions during the sur-
vey period. In Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Marshall, 613 S.W.2d 129 (Ky. 1981), the respon-
dent was found to have neglected a divorce matter entrusted to him for more than four
years. Id. Even though Marshall was also found to have appeared in court while under an
order of suspension for failure to pay bar dues and to have misrepresented to a circuit court
his status as attorney for the client, the Court imposed only a one-year suspension. Id.
In Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Morton, 613 S.W.2d 416 (Ky. 1981), the respondent at-
torney failed to take any action whatsoever to prosecute a personal injury claim on behalf
of an injured client even though he had agreed to do so. Id. at 417. That neglect resulted in
the running of the statute of limitations on the claim some ten months after Morton com-
menced the representation. Id. The Court suspended Morton for one year, despite his fail-
ure even to respond to the charge before the Supreme Court. Id.
In fact, only two cases of neglect have resulted in disbarment in Kentucky. In
Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Dillman, 562 S.W.2d 318 (Ky. 1978), the attorney was disbarred
for neglect which resulted in the running of the statutory appeal period for a Federal Coal
Mine Health and Safety Act proceeding, and for misrepresentating to his client the status
of such proceeding. Id. at 318. It should be noted, however, that Dillman had previously
been suspended twice for one year for similar instances of gross neglect and misrepresenta-
tion. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Dillman, 554 S.W.2d 362 (Ky. 1977); Kentucky Bar Ass'n
v. Dilhman, 539 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1976).
The Dillman result must be contrasted with Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Jansen,
459 S.W.2d 140 (Ky. 1970), in which the respondent attorney was disbarred for neglecting
a divorce case. Id. at 141. The Court's harsh reaction to this single instance of neglect ap-
parently was a product of the Court's outrage at its inability to contact Jansen, even with
the use of a specially appointed "warning order attorney," rather than a product of its out-
rage at the neglect charge. Id. at 140.
Thus the crackdown on neglect threatened by the Court in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Clem, 554 S.W.2d 360, 361 (Ky. 1977), has not materialized. Dillman remains the single
instance of disbarment for neglect since Clem.
59 In one case during the survey period the Court imposed a three-year suspension for
neglecting legal matters. In Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Brown, 599 S.W.2d 169, the respon-
dent attorney was found to have neglected the legal affairs of four clients. No further de-
scription of the conduct is mentioned in the Court's opinion. It is impossible, therefore, to
discern what factors led the Court to impose a more serious sanction in Brown than in
Reed. See the text accompanying notes 53-57 supra for a discussion of the Reed case. The
respondent attorney in Brown was subsequently disbarred for misuse of clients' funds. See
the text accompanying notes 17-21 supra for a discussion of this later case involving
Brown's misuse of client's funds.
60 See notes 1, 2, & 52 supra and the accompanying text for discussions of public dis-
content with the legal profession.
61 No Kentucky cases during the survey period involved forms of legal incompetence
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IV. NONPROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
Occasionally the Court is called upon to discipline attorneys
for misconduct occurring outside of their law practices.6 2 Under-
standably, the punishment imposed by the Court in such cases
depends on the seriousness of the misconduct and its reflection
both upon the individual attorney's fitness to practice law and
upon the profession. 6 In one case involving nonprofessional mis-
other than neglect. The Code provides that an attorney shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not
competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is compe-
tent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circum-
stances.
DR 6-101(A)(1)-(2). The dearth of Kentucky disciplinary cases involving charges of in-
competence may indicate an attitude on the part of the state bar association and the Court
that such claims are better made and resolved in the context of private malpractice litiga-
tion.
While the present disciplinary process may not be ideal for the resolution of in-
competency claims, it seems unwise to rely upon the initiative of private litigants to police
the competence of the practicing bar in malpractice actions. See, e.g., Marks & Cathcart,
Discipline Within the Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 194 nn.4-
6; Martyn, Lawyer Competence and Lawyer Discipline: Beyond the Bar?, 69 GEo. L.J.
705,709-10 (1980).
62 The Code prohibits illegal activity within the practice itself in several provisions.
For example, in the representation of a client an attorney is not to "[kinowingly engage
in... illegal conduct." DR 7-102(A)(8). An attorney is prohibited from charging an "il-
legal" fee. DR 2-106(A). An attorney is also prohibited from aiding non-lawyers in the un-
authorized practice of law and from practicing law in jurisdictions in which the attorney
is not admitted. DR 3-101(A)-(B).
But the Code also prohibits certain other misconduct whether committed in the
representation of a client or not. DR 1-102(A) provides that an attorney shall not:
(3) Engage in illegal conduct involving moral turpitude.
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion.
(5) Engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
(6) Engage in any other conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to prac-
tice law.
DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6). In disciplining attorneys for illegal conduct outside the practice of
law, however, the Court generally refers to the conduct only as "unprofessional or uneth-
ical conduct tending to bring the bench and bar into disrepute." See SCR 3.130(1). See
note 10 supra for a discussion of the Court's tendency to rely on this catch-all language and
to avoid relying on specific provisions of the Code.
6 From 1971 to 1978, SCR 3.320 provided for the automatic disbarment of attor-
neys convicted of a misdemeanor involving dishonesty or stealing or a felony. Several at-
torneys were disbarred under that rule. See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Clem, 561
S.W.2d 90 (Ky. 1978); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Rinehart, 558 S.W.2d 611 (Ky. 1977). By a
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conduct during this survey period,64 however, the Court re-
sponded with unjustifiable leniency.
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Clay,'- the respondent attor-
ney had previously been charged by his former wife with crim-
inal mischief in the third degree, assault in the third degree, and
terroristic threatening.6 He had been convicted of all three of-
fenses. 67 Despite the serious nature of the offenses66 and their re-
flection on Clay's attitude toward an ordered system of conduct
and the peaceful resolution of disputes,6 the Court chose only to
1978 amendment, however, SCR 3.320 now provides:
When any member of the Association has been convicted of a felony or class
"A" misdemeanor a copy of the judgment shall be filed with the Director for
action under Rule 3.160. The Director shall submit copies of the judgment
to the Tribunal who may take action under Rule 3.165.
Under SCR 3.165, the Court may also temporarily suspend an attorney convicted of a fel-
ony or class A misdemeanor upon a finding that the conduct was such "as to put in grave
issue whether he has the moral fitness to continue to practice law."
The substance of the previous SCR 3.320 may, however, survive the rule's amend-
ment. In the two cases concerning convictions of an attorney which have arisen since the
rule's amendment, the Court disbarred an attorney convicted of a felony, Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. White, 613 S.W.2d 132, and publicly reprimanded another attorney convicted of
a misdemeanor not involving dishonesty or stealing. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Clay, 601
S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1980). It is too early to tell, however, whether the Court's treatment of
these cases will be the same under the amended SCR 3.320.
One conviction which uniformly results in a six-month suspension from the prac-
tice of law is that of failure to file tax returns. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Kramer, 555
S.W.2d 245; Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 549 S.W.2d 508 (Ky. 1976); Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. Trimble, 540 S.W.2d 599; Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Vincent, 537 S.W.2d 171;
Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. McAfee, 301 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1957).
64 The only other disciplinary case which arose during this survey period involving a
respondent attorney convicted of a crime was Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. White, 613 S.W.2d
132. Because the crime in White involved fraud, the case is discussed in the context of mis-
representation by attorneys. See note 37 supra for a discussion of White.
65 601 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1980).
66 Id. at 287.
6 7 1Id.
6 Criminal mischief in the third degree, KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 512.040 (Bobbs-
Merrill 1975) [hereinafter cited as KRS], is a class B misdemeanor, but assault in the third
degree, KRS § 508.030 (1975), and terroristic threatening, KRS § 508.080 (1975), are
both class A misdemeanors. For committing the offenses, Clay was sentenced to 60 days
imprisonment for each offense, the sentences to run concurrently. The sentence was sus-
pended for two years. 601 S.W.2d at 287.
0 Such acts certainly reflect negatively on the attorney's "fitness to practice law."
DR 1-102(A) (6). Furthermore, if any misconduct falls within the "other unprofessional or
unethical conduct tending to bring the bench and bar into disrepute" language of SCR
3.130(1), it would seem to be that involved in Clay.
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publicly reprimand him. 70 While there may have been evidence
before the Court of factors warranting such lenient treatment of
the respondent attorney, 71 none was disclosed in the opinion. In
the absence of such evidence, the Court's disposition of Clay
seems unduly protective of the attorney. The public reprimand
of an attorney convicted of criminal acts of violence suggests to
the bar and, more importantly, to the public that the Court does
not take such misconduct seriously.
V. MISCONDUCT AND FREE SPEECH
One category of professional misconduct to which the Court
correctly reacts with considerable caution is activity involving
free speech. The dictates of the first amendment justify a policy
of erring on the side of leniency in such cases.
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Nal, 72 for example, the re-
spondent attorney stated in a radio interview that a state
agency's proceedings were a "mere farce" and a "kangaroo
court."73 He also claimed to appear at the agency hearing on be-
half of several persons he did not actually represent,7 4 was rude
and sarcastic to the hearing officer, 75 and sought in writing the
governor's assistance in the agency proceeding. 76 Without further
discussion the Court found that such conduct was "not accep-
table"77 and publicly reprimanded the attorney.78
70 601 S.W.2d at 287.
71 Apparently the acts of violence were related to "serious difficulties which resulted
in a dissolution of [the respondent attorney's] marriage." Id. No further mention is made,
however, of any factors considered in mitigation of the punishment.
72 599 S.W.2d 899 (Ky. 1980).
73 Id. Such statements are arguably violative of DR 7-107(H)(5) in that they are
"reasonably likely to interfere with a fair hearing."
74 599 S.W.2d at 899. Such conduct is violative of DR 7-102(A)(5) as the making of a
false statement of fact and is also arguably violative of DR 1-102(A)(4) as conduct involv-
ing misrepresentation.
75 599 S.W.2d at 899. Such conduct before a tribunal is violative of DR 7-106(C)(6)
in that it is "undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal."
76 599 S.W.2d at 899. Such conduct is arguably violative of DR 7-110(B) in that it is
a communication regarding the merits of a pending case with an "official before whom
the proceeding is pending." Since the proceeding was pending in an administrative agency
within the executive branch of government, it might be said that the governor, as head of
the executive branch, was such an official.
77 599 S.W.2d at 899.
78 Id.
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The Court's thinking regarding such cases was further expli-
cated in Kentucky Bar Association v. Heleringer. 79 In Heleringer,
the respondent attorney-at a press conference-referred to a
circuit court's ex parte hearing of a motion for a temporary re-
straining order as "'highly unethical and grossly unfair.""8° The
Kentucky Supreme Court noted that the statement was totally
incorrect since under the rules of civil procedure, temporary re-
straining orders may indeed by issued on an ex parte basis.8' Thus
Heleringer's statement was a false accusation against a judge
2
and was conduct "prejudicial to the administration of justice."83
In deciding whether such speech was nonetheless protected
under the first amendment,8 the Court indicated that there were
four categories of criticism which may not be prohibited: crit-
icism of the state of the law itself,"' criticism of the agencies en-
forcing the law,86 criticism of a court's view of the law,87 and crit-
icism of a court's ethics or motive when "made in good faith and
supported by substantial competent evidence."s Since the state-
ments made by the respondent attorney in Heleringer impuned
the ethics of the circuit court in hearing the matter ex parte, and
since Heleringer knew or should have known that the statements
were without basis in fact, the speech was not protected by the
first amendment.89 The Court chose, as in Nall,e to issue a public
reprimand of the respondent attorney. 9'
79 602 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1980).
So Id. at 166.
81 Id. at 166-67. See Ky. R. Civ. P. 65.03.
82 602 S.W.2d at 166. See DR 8-102(B).
83 602 S.W.2d at 166. See DR 1-102(A)(5).
84 The Court analyzed the matter under In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622 (1959). See 602
S.W.2d at 167-68.
85 602 S.W.2d at 167.
88 Id.
87 Id.
8 Id. at 168.
89 Id. at 167-68.
90 See the text accompanying notes 72-78 supra for a discussion of Nail.
91 602 S.W.2d at 169. The Court noted further, however, that "while two recent in-
stances such as this one may be a coincidence, three would certainly indicate an unwel-
come trend. It is enough to say that in the future a stiffer penalty may be imposed." Id. at
168. In two earlier cases the Court imposed six-month suspensions for, in part, unsup-
ported criticism of judicial competence. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Getty, 535 S.W.2d 91
(Ky. 1975); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lewis, 282 S.W.2d 321 (Ky. 1955).
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In an unpublished opinion, Kentucky Bar Association v.
Wilkey, 92 the Court addressed yet another aspect of attorney
speech. There the respondent attorney, employed by a legal assis-
tance organization, 93 gave unsolicited legal advice to a juvenile
inmate of a county jail suggesting that the juvenile institute civil
rights litigation against several public officials.4 Wilkey then
commenced the action on the juvenile's behalf. 95 While such soli-
citation is generally prohibited by the Code,96 the Court found
that Wilkey's conduct fell within an exception to those general
proscriptions for attorneys employed by legal service organiza-
tions.97 Since the Code specifically permitted such solicitation,
92 No. 80-SC-671-KB (Ky. Dec. 16, 1980).
93 Id.,slip op. at 2.
4 Id.,slip op. at l.
95 Id., slip op. at 2. The action was subsequently dismissed when the plaintiff-juve-
nile testified in a deposition that he had not authorized an action for damages and that he
no longer wished to pursue the matter. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
96 The Code generally prohibits an attorney from recommending the employment of
himself or an associate, DR 2-103(A), requesting another to make that recommendation,
DR 2-103(C), or compensating another for having done so, DR 2-103(B). Additionally,
DR 2-104(A) generally prohibits an attorney from giving unsolicited legal advice that a
person institute legal action and then accepting employment in the case, except in certain
situations specified in the rule. The question in Wilkey was whether the respondent attor-
ney's conduct came within one of the exceptions to DR 2-104(A). See note 97 infra for the
text of DR 2-104(A).
97 The applicable Code provision states in pertinent part:
(A) A lawyer who has given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should
obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment resulting
from that advice, except that:
(3) A lawyer who is furnished or paid by any of the offices or organ-
izations enumerated in DR 2-103(D)(1), (2), or (5) may represent a
member or beneficiary thereof, to the extent and under the condi-
tions prescribed therein.
DR 2-104(A) (3). DR 2-103(D) (1) (c) states:
(D) A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a person or organization that recom-
mends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to promote the use of his services
or those of his partners or associates. However, he may cooperate in a digni-
fied manner with the legal service activities of any of the following, pro-
vided that his independent professional judgment is exercised in behalf of his
client without interference or control by any organization or other person:
(1) A legal aid office or public defender office:
(c) Operated or sponsored by a governmental agency.
It should be noted, however, that the provisions quoted above are from the original 1969
version of the Code, not the Code as amended by the American Bar Association since then.
It is the Court's position that the 1969 version of the Code is applicable in Kentucky. See
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the Court did not have to address the constitutional issues often
raised by solicitation cases.98
Two other aspects of Wilkey, however, are more significant
than its actual holding. First, the Court announced unequivocal-
ly that only the original 1969 version of the American Bar Asso-
ciation's Code of Professional Responsibility is applicable in Ken-
tucky; 9 and none of the amendments of the Code which have
been subsequently adopted by that organization apply. 100 It is, of
course, unfortunate that the Court chose an unpublished opinion
for this pronouncement. Second, the Court urged the bar asso-
ciation in the future to phrase its charges against attorneys in
terms of the Code'01 rather than advancing them under the rubric
of "unprofessional or unethical conduct tending to bring the
bench and bar into disrepute."102 To the extent the bar associa-
tion adheres to that suggestion, 1"0 the entire disciplinary process
in Kentucky will be greatly enhanced. 104
the text accompanying notes 99-100 infra for a discussion of the Court's view on the appli-
cability of the 1969 version. Both DR 2-103 and DR 2-104 were amended by the American
Bar Association in 1974, 1975, and 1977. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSiONAL RESPoNSiDiL-
ry DR 2-103 & DR 2-104 (as amended through February, 1981).
98 Certain solicitation which is prohibited by the Code is, nonetheless, constitution-
ally protected speech under the first amendment. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412
(1978).
99 No. 80-SC-671-KB, slip op. at 3-4.
100 The Code has been amended by the American Bar Association every year be-
tween 1974 and 1980. The apparent rationale of the Court in concluding that these
amendments are not applicable in Kentucky is that SCR 3.130(1) was promulgated by an
order of the Court on November 11, 1969, and that no subsequent amendment of that rule
has expressly adopted any of the American Bar Association's amendments.
101 No. 80-SC-671-KB, slip op. at 3.
102 SCR 3.130(1).
103 The Court merely indicated in Wilkey that it would be a "salutory practice" for
the bar association to state its charges in terms of the Code provisions. No. 80-SC-671-KB,
slip op. at 3. It is difficult to perceive from the published opinions whether the Court's
urging has been followed by the bar association. Of the eight disciplinary decisions in the
survey period following Wilkey, only one makes any reference to Code provisions. This is
not to say, however, that the bar association's charges also failed to make reference to the
Code, although it may indicate that the bar association has not changed its practices.
104 Presumably the court's suggestion to the bar association indicates that the Court
will analyze attorneys' conduct in disciplinary cases under the Code provisions as well.
Such a practice would provide greater notice and guidance to the practicing bar regarding
the Court's construction of the applicable body of disciplinary law. See notes 6 & 10 supra
for a discussion of the need for the Court to make more specific reference to relevant Code
provisions.
1981-82] SURVEY-PRoFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILITY
CONCLUSION
Considerable improvement in the Court's regulation of mis-
conduct within the legal profession could be obtained by the
abandonment of the current use of unduly abbreviated opinions
in disciplinary cases. Such opinions generally provide no gui-
dance to the Court's construction of the Code or the factors it has
relied upon in imposing a particular sanction. As a result, the
Court's supervision of legal ethics at times appears inconsistent
and unjustifiably lenient. Such appearances may not accurately
reflect the reality of the Court's treatment of professional ethics.
If that is so, the Court can correct the misimpression by more
carefully explaining its disposition of disciplinary cases. Such an
effort would better inform the practicing bar about the profes-
sional standards it is expected to meet and would provide the
general public, the ultimate beneficiaries of the regulatory pro-
cess, with greater assurance as to the Court's resolve in its task.

